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Practical men who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual 
influences are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. 
Keynes (1936, p. 383) 
The high and growing debt burden is the major source of the sharp slowdown in 
Pakistan’s economic growth … and the consequent increase in poverty incidence. 
…Pakistan is…caught in the vicious circle of high debt payments leading to 
stagnation in investment and growth, and low growth in turn limiting the capacity to 
service debt and reduce the debt burden. 
Pakistan (March, 2001, p. xvii) 
 
The Government of Pakistan believes that “high and growing” indebtedness 
of the government is reflected in falling investment and growth rates of the economy, 
leading to growing poverty of the people. This paper examines how this came to be, 
and whether the connections implicit in this assessment do in fact exist? On this 
basis, the paper also comments on the efficacy of some current policy proposals. 
 
1.  INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
The conventional wisdom is that “persistent fiscal and balance of payments 
deficits are a fundamental source of Pakistan’s high debt burden” [Pakistan (2001), 
p. xv)].1 The State Bank of Pakistan (2001, p. 117) goes further:  “This…public debt 
is the result of structural weaknesses in the domestic economy and the external 
account. Excessive government expenditures, stagnant tax revenues, high returns on 
government securities and inappropriate sequencing of financial reforms, led to a 
bludgeoning (sic.) domestic debt profile. On the external front, large current account 
deficits, stagnant export revenues and declining worker (sic.) remittances, effectively 
forced Pakistan into an unsustainable situation”. All this is true, but hardly 
exhaustive. 
 
Arshad Zaman is Managing Director at Arshad Zaman Associates (Pvt.), Ltd., Karachi. 
1This is echoed in the Economic Survey, which ascribes “the accumulation of external debt” 
mainly to “(i) persistently large current account deficit; (ii) imprudent use of borrowed resources…” and 
“(iii) …stagnant exports and rising real cost of external borrowing” [Pakistan (2001), p. 137]. 
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Surely, a meaningful explanation of our present predicament should lead us to 
an understanding of why, and how, the government continued to incur “persistent” 
deficits, despite a clear appreciation of the consequences of this behaviour? The short 
answer to this question is that in Pakistan the government’s demand for loans is 
infinite, while in the world the supply of loans depends in general on the availability 
of cyclical capital surpluses in the world economy, and to Pakistan on a number of 
widely fluctuating political variables.2 As a result, whatever debt was made available 
to the government, on the security of the nation, was incurred and when the spigot 
was turned off, the government incurred more debt to finance the higher 
expenditures induced by earlier debt. If this is correct then the remedies presently 
being suggested—raise taxes and exports, lower expenditure and imports—are 
unlikely to be effective. 
In order to examine this suggestion more closely, it is necessary to define 
more carefully many of the words that are commonly employed in popular and 
policy discussions. Who contracts public debt in Pakistan? Is it the state, the 
government or the administration?3 Strictly speaking, there is no state in Pakistan; 
there is only an administration (military and civil officials engaged in the process of 
government) engaged in the task of government.  
In reflecting upon “the state” in Pakistan, the first difficulty is that “the term 
‘state’ itself is an elusive one, for it is so associated with modern European 
conceptions that in some respects it is not appropriate to apply the term to the 
institutions of these countries”.4 Even so, although there is “a community” that has a 
monopoly—more or less—over coercive ability within the territory of Pakistan, it 
has failed to devise institutions that confer legitimacy over the use of this force.5 This 
is true despite the fact that there has always been an ongoing effort to build a state, 
 
2On debt cycles, see, among others, Suter (1992). 
3In Max Weber’s classical definition, “a state is a human community that (successfully) claims 
the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” [Almond and Coleman, p. 
5]. The administration, in the sense of a salaried class of administrators, is a component of the state. 
Government, the act by which a few impose their will upon the many, can be through a state (as it 
emerged in Western Europe) or through other arrangements. 
4Banuazizi and Weiner (1987, p. 7). “The state implies a sovereign authority, a sovereignty based 
upon both consent and coercion. The state is associated with a particular bounded territory over which it 
exercises a monopoly of coercive authority. Legitimacy implies myths and symbols which provide a kind 
of ideological rationalisation and justification for this monopoly of coercive authority. In modern Europe 
the expansion of the state was linked to the expansion of the monarchies at the expense of other 
authorities, notably the church and feudal magnates. Initially the authority of the modern European state 
rested on the notion of the sacredness of the office of the king; subsequently, the notion of the sovereign 
state rested on conceptions of legal rights on the part of citizens in relation to authority, on sovereignty as 
an inalienable right of the people and, above all, on the capacity of the state to command resources”. 
[Banuazizi and Weiner (1987), pp. 7-8.] 
5The word “institutions” is used in its technical sense: institutions “are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction,” while organisations “are groups of individuals bound by some 
common purpose to achieve objectives” [North (1990), pp. 3, 5]. 
Economics of Stateless Nations 
 
1123 
initially by the politicians and since 1958 by the military.6  We need not be detained 
by the reasons for the failure of “the few” who came to and have held the helm of 
affairs in post-colonial Pakistan to agree on questions of authority and coercion, a 
subject that has been and continues to be warmly debated—in tea houses, drawing 
rooms, the popular press, poetry and academic prose. For the purposes of this paper 
it should suffice to note that there is no state, in any meaningful sense of the word, in 
Pakistan.  
In the absence of any agreed scheme for legitimising the exercise of 
power, electoral politics and the political governments that ensue from time to 
time are a creation of the administration. Consequently, all references to state or 
government in Pakistan are in fact a reference to what in Pakistan is called the 
bureaucracy. In the absence of any formal or informal institutional constraints on 
the bureaucracy, the amount “Pakistan” has borrowed has been limited only by 
the willingness of lenders to provide loans. If this perception is correct, then 
Pakistan’s public debt is less “the result of structural weaknesses in the domestic 
economy and the external account” than of weaknesses in the structure of 
domestic politics and governance and these weaknesses are the “fundamental 
source” of “persistent fiscal and balance of payments deficits” as well as 
“Pakistan’s high debt burden” [The State Bank of Pakistan (2001), p. 117 and 
Pakistan (2001), p. xv, quoted above]. 
Before turning to a review of the impact of high debt on growth and poverty, 
it is worth considering the relevance and efficacy of popular perceptions of 
“governance” as a panacea, especially in what might be called stateless nations. 
Once again, it is useful to define terms. Although in Europe societies came to be 
governed through a set of historical arrangements referred to as the state, it is 
possible to have a government—arrangements by which “the few” impose their will 
upon “the many”—without a state.7 Governance, then, can be defined quite generally 
as the manner of government.8 Although there are no agreed definitions, there is also 
a need to distinguish “good government”—presumably, a just and benevolent 
 
6Banuazizi and Weiner (1987, p. 8): “[In the case of Afghanistan and Iran the monarchs, and] in 
the case of Pakistan the military rulers, aspired to create modern states with an exclusive monopoly of 
coercive authority and control over the entire territory over which they had international judicial authority 
and to gain some form of popular legitimacy”. 
7The vocabulary of “the few” and “the many” is an attempt to abstain from specifying a defining 
quality of those who exercise power, implicit in terms like the ruling class, the èlite, the ‘salariat’, 
‘insiders vs. outsiders’ etc. 
8This is consistent with a recent definition: “We define governance broadly as the traditions and 
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (1) the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively 
formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions 
that govern economic and social interactions among them.” Kaufmann, Kraay, Zoido-Lobatón (October 
1999, p. 1). Note, however, that the idea of “citizens” is problematic in the context of Pakistan (and 
similar stateless nations). Also, the omission of “political” in (3) is curious. 
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government whether despotism, democracy, or some other arrangement9—from 
“good governance,” which would refer presumably to the preferred manner of (or 
arrangements for) governing. While these lead naturally to a definition of 
“misgovernment,” it is not clear what “misgovernance” means.10 
In the light of this discussion, what does “good governance” mean in a 
stateless nation? Does it mean the establishment of a state, a la Europe? Or can we 
do with improvements in the stateless governance that exists, with an eye on final 
outcomes? In which case, general homilies on governance will not do. Instead 
proposals that are carefully tailored to the institutional circumstances of Pakistan 
would have to be crafted. Without an answer to these questions, statements like “The 
issue of improving governance is central to fighting poverty, and thus cuts across all 
the elements of Pakistan’s poverty reduction strategy” are hard to understand, much 
less evaluate as a sensible policy proposal.11 It is equally difficult to understand how 
the following general statement by an aid agency would be applicable to Pakistan 
(and similar countries): 
For the poor good governance is not a luxury. The quality of governance 
determines whether they achieve their rights and receive basic services. In the 
past, most of our effort went into improving the efficiency of government 
through civil service and revenue reform, policing, local government and 
public enterprise privatisation. We now recognise that we should address 
wider issues as well including political systems and corruption if governments 
are to be more responsive to the needs of poor people. 
Our new approach will cover a number of strands—democratic accountability, 
fundamental freedoms, corruption, service delivery for all, due process rights 
and security—which, when brought together should lead to governance which 
is representative of, and accountable to all its people and effective in realising 
their rights.12 
Surely this would call for bringing about a democratic revolution, before any 
progress is made on improving governance. 
 
9Lord Lytton to Lord Salisbury (11 May, 1877): “I am convinced that the fundamental mistake of 
able and experienced Indian officials is a belief that we can hold India securely by what they call good 
government; that is to say by improving the condition of the ryot, strictly administering justice, spending 
immense sums on irrigation works, etc. Politically speaking, the Indian peasantry is an inert mass. If it 
ever moves at all, it will move in obedience, not to its British masters, but to its native chiefs and 
princes… The only political representatives of native opinion are the Baboos, whom we have educated to 
write semi-seditious articles in the native Press, and who really represent nothing but the social anomaly 
of their own position….” [Stokes, p. 286)]. 
10See, for example, Kaufmann, Kraay, Zoido-Lobatón (October 1999, p. 1): “In recent years there 
has been a surge of interest in the consequences of governance and misgovernance for development”. 
11 Pakistan (November 2001, p. 3). 
12Posted under “Who We Are” on the site of the Governance Department, DFID. 
Economics of Stateless Nations 
 
1125 
2.  THE RECORD: DEBT, GROWTH, AND POVERTY  
IN PAKISTAN 
In looking at the data, a distinction can be made between the experience of 
United Pakistan (1947–71) and Contemporary Pakistan (since 1971). In the first 
period, four phases can be identified: (i) reconstruction and self-reliant development 
(1947–53), (ii) preparation of the First Five-Year Plan, with US intellectual and 
financial assistance (1953–58), (iii) the “miracle” years of aid-financed “crony” 
capitalism (1958-65), and (iv) disintegration leading to the secession of East Pakistan 
(1965–71). The souring of the “miracle” of aid-financed growth marked the 
beginning of the emigration of a growing class of bureaucrats, professionals and 
other influential persons from Pakistan, who have played a significant role in 
Pakistan since the 1980s. 
In the contemporary period, four phases can be identified: (i) the Islamic 
Socialism of Bhutto (1971–77), in which an effort was made to correct the excesses 
of the “miracle” years, (ii) the Islamic Capitalism of Zia-ul-Haq (1977–88), which 
undid Bhutto’s nationalisation but continued to pursue populist policies, albeit with 
appeal to Islamic (rather than socialist) values and symbols, (iii) the period of State 
Capture by expatriate groups in league with international and national civil servants 
(1988–99), during which a chaotic programme of economic liberalisation (“structural 
adjustment”) was implemented with dire consequences, and (iv) the present period of 
military rule (since October 1999), in which the anti-national effects of state capture 
are being undone without any appreciable shift in economic strategy or policies.13 
Basic data on debt, growth and poverty in Pakistan are presented in Table 1 for these 
periods, along with an indication of global and domestic political regimes, Pakistan-
US relations, and the period of intensive IMF programmes.14 
 
Public Debt 
The key to the unrestrained rise in public debt in Pakistan lies in the nature of 
public finance  in stateless societies and the international political economy of capital  
 
13A more extended discussion of the logic of these characterisations and an appraisal of key 
developments during these periods see Zaman (1998). 
14Data on growth are based on the national accounts, which are available continuously from 
1950. The series now exclude the former East Pakistan, but suffer from some deficiencies of coverage 
and continuity (mainly services and the informal sectors, and prices and deflators). External debt data 
were cleaned up in 2001, following the recommendations of the Debt Reduction and Management 
Committee [Pakistan (2001)]. Earlier data, not comparable with the fresh estimates, is available from 
government publications. Data on military debt is reported to the IMF/WB, but is not made public. 
Details on the exact impact of recent debt relief are not readily available. Estimates of poverty 
indicators are based mainly on the Federal Bureau of Statistics’ 11 household income and expenditure 
surveys (carried out between 1963-64 and 1996-97) and 4 integrated household surveys (carried out in 
1991, 1995-96, 1996-97, and 1998-99), and the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics’ socio-
economic survey in 1998-99. 
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Table 1 
Debt, Growth, and Poverty in Pakistan, 1950-2001 
(Average Annual Rates of Growth, % Per Annum) 
Geographical Boundaries: United Pakistan (1947-71) Contemporary Pakistan (1971 – …) 
Global Political Regime: Cold War (1949-89) Pax Americana 
Pakistan-US Relations            
(G–Good, B–Bad) G (‘54-62) B (‘65-81) G (‘81–98 B (’98-01) 
IMF Programmes    1980-83 ‘88-91, 93-96, 97-00 
Domestic Political Regime    
(C–Civil, M–Military) C M C M C M 
Growth of: 1950–58a 1958–71a 1971–77 1977–88 1988–99 1999–01 
Domestic Debt Outstanding – – – – 15.8 11.7 
Medium and Long-term 
External Debt b 35.4 5.1 7.5 1.6 0.8 0.5 
Real GNP Per Capita 0.9 4.2 3.3 3.0 0.4 1.4 
Real GDP at Factor Cost 3.3 6.2 4.8 6.6 1.0 3.2 
   Agriculture 1.8 4.3 2.2 3.9 1.0 1.7 
   Large-scale Manufacturing 19.8 12.1 2.3 9.4 1.1 4.3 
Employment – 1.6 3.0 2.4 0.4 2.2 
   Agriculture – 0.8 1.8 2.0 0.2 2.3 
   Large-scale Manufacturing – 3.6 3.0 1.7 -0.2 2.1 
Changes in Poverty               
(All Pakistan)  1964–70 1970–79 1979–88   
    All Pakistan  Rise Fall Fall Rise Rise 
    Rural Areas  Rise Fall Fall Rise Rise 
   Urban Areas  Fall Fall Fall Rise Rise 
Source: On debt and growth, published statistics from Government of Pakistan and State Bank of Pakistan 
publications; on poverty, consensus views in the literature, as summarised in Arif (2001). 
Note: Except for 1999-01 [and domestic debt–revise OLS], all growth rates have been calculated by fitting 
an ordinary least squares trend. 
–not available. 
a(West) Pakistan only. 
bNon-military public and publicly guaranteed debt outstanding and disbursed. 
 
supply. Lacking legitimacy, governments since the early 1950s have found it more 
congenial to raise foreign loans in return for economic and political concessions than 
to raise taxes. The historical pattern of commitments and disbursements of medium 
and long-term external public debt is illustrated in Figure 1. 
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The availability of external capital—and hence the ability to incur external 
debt—has been determined by the status of Pakistan’s relations with the US. In 
general, the availability of loans to the government has spiked due to regional crises 
and has nose-dived due to domestic developments. Sharp increases in aid 
availability, such as the one being envisaged presently, occurred in the wake of the 
revolution in China (1949), in Iran and the Russian invasion of Afghanistan (both in 
1979), and the American invasion of Afghanistan (October 2001). Equally sharp 
downturns followed war with India (1965), the detonation of a nuclear device (May 
1998), and the military takeover (October 1999). The availability of US military and 
economic loans has always had a multiplier effect in inducing bilateral and 
multilateral economic loans.  
 
Economic Growth 
It is widely believed that whatever the ill effects of the neglect of the poor—
and recourse to foreign “aid”—economic growth in Pakistan was spectacular in the 
“golden 1960s” and even over a longer time period, fairly good. Some new data that 
has emerged refutes this. Over the long term, Pakistan along with Myanmar are the 
only two countries in the world to have suffered a fall of two quartiles in relative 
income position, among forty two major nations, in the course of the twentieth 
century (Table 2). 
Fig. 1. Pakistan: Commitments and Disbursements of M&LT External
Public Debt. 
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Table 2  
Changes in Nations’ Relative Income Position1 
 2000 GDP Per Capita Group 
1900 GDP Per Capita Group 
Lowest 
Quartile 
Centre Low 
Quartile 
Centre 
High 
Quartile 
Highest 
Quartile 
Egypt ($509)  Egypt ($2,279)   Lowest 
Quartile India ($625) 
China2 ($652) 
                          India3 ($1,880)  
Centre 
Low 
Quartile 
China2 ($652)                                China2 ($6,283) 
China2 ($652) 
Myanmar ($667) 
Pakistan ($687) 
Brazil ($704) 
Indonesia ($745) 
Taiwan ($759) 
Thailand ($812) 
Peru ($817) 
Venezuela ($821) 
South Korea ($850) 
Columbia ($973) 
Philippines ($1,033) 
Japan ($1,135) 
 
Myanmar ($1,079) 
Pakistan ($1,773) 
 
 
 
Brazil ($5,355) 
Indonesia ($3,136) 
 
Thailand ($5,720) 
Peru ($3,797) 
 
 
Columbia ($5,514) 
Philippines ($2,442) 
 
 
 
 
 
Taiwan ($16,854) 
 
 
Venezuela ($7,643) 
South Korea ($14,293) 
 
 
Japan ($20,616) 
Mexico ($1,157)  Mexico5 ($5,721)  
Centre 
High 
Quartile 
USSR4 ($1,218)  USSR4 ($3,686)   
Highest 
Quartile      
Source: IMF (May 2000, p. 157). Nations that remained in the same GDP per capita Group quartile have 
not been shown. 
1To partition the population of the 42 sample countries into income quartiles, the population of China, 
India, Russia, and Mexico were split and partially allocated to different income quartiles. GDP per capita 
in constant 1990 dollars at purchasing power parities for each country and period is given in parentheses. 
2In 1900 China’s population of the 42 sample countries actually filled the entire centre-low-income 
quartile, spilling over into both neighbouring quartiles. In 2000 it straddled the borderline between the two 
upper-income quartiles. 
3India’s population straddled the borderline between the two lowest per capita income quartiles in 2000. 
4Former USSR. The former USSR’s population straddled the borderline between the two upper income 
quartiles in 1900. 
5Mexico’s population straddled the borderline between the two centre income quartiles in 2000. 
 
More immediately, however, did the government’s (“high and growing”) 
indebtedness since the 1980s cause the nation’s production growth to slow down? It 
probably did, but not entirely through the mechanisms that are popularly identified in 
this process. Conventional wisdom has it that capital formation (or investment) has a 
direct multiplier effect on economic growth—a view characterised as “capital 
fundamentalism” [Easterly (1997)].  In this view, high public debt affects growth in 
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two ways. First, the burden of debt servicing reduces public saving, and hence public 
investment. Second, the government’s demand for credit raises interest rates, which 
in turn lowers private investment. 
The idea that the rate of investment is a proximate determinant of the rate of 
economic growth has a long and venerable history: 
The central problem in the theory of economic development is to understand 
the process by which a community which was previously saving and investing 
4 or 5 percent of its national income or less, converts itself into an economy 
where voluntary saving is running at about 12 to 15 percent of national 
income or more. This is the central problem because the central fact of 
development is rapid capital accumulation (including knowledge and skills 
with capital). [Lewis (1954), p. 155]. 
As an appreciation of a puzzle in the economic history of Western Europe in 
the nineteenth century this was certainly true. As a timeless proposition, however, 
the statement was patently false. In the early 1950s, however, the US was looking for 
an ideology to sponsor in competition with communism, and a formula to rationalise 
the distribution of US aid. Lewis’s reduction of development to growth, the 
suggestion that growth was a multiple of the investment rate, itself determined by the 
saving rate, proved both convenient and convincing. Apart from its simplicity, it 
provided a ready formula for assessing the “investment requirements” of any target 
rate of growth and, by deducting saving, the “aid requirements” of every country on 
a seemingly rational basis. Despite its bureaucratic convenience and hence its long 
life, however, there was no theoretical justification or empirical support for this view 
of economic growth. 
In fact, the more sophisticated view based on the idea of an aggregate 
production function, that variations in economic growth could be explained by 
variations in factor inputs also failed to find empirical support. Faced with this 
theoretical embarrassment economists came up with the idea of “total factor 
productivity” to rescue the aggregate production function. Based on an extensive 
review of the professional literature Easterly and Levine (2001) provide a convincing 
case for abandoning this charade that has underpinned policy discourse during the Cold 
War era. Instead, they find the following five stylised facts about economic growth: 
(1) The ‘residual’ (total factor productivity, TFP) rather than factor 
accumulation accounts for most of the income and growth differences across 
countries. (2) Income diverges over the long run. (3) Factor accumulation is 
persistent while growth is not, and the growth path of countries exhibits 
remarkable variation. (4) Economic activity is highly concentrated, with all 
factors of production flowing to the richest countries. (5) National policies are 
closely associated with long-run economic growth rates. [Easterly and Levine, 
2001), p. 177]. 
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This is fully consistent with the argument advanced in this paper, except that 
we would identify the ‘residual’ with institutions (including governance), rather than 
total factor productivity.15 With this shift, this paper identifies the structure of 
institutions and institutional developments as the proximate determinant of both the 
rise in debt and the fall in growth.16 A second major factor that has contributed to the 
slow down in economic growth and the rise in poverty since the late 1980s (see 
Table 1 above) has been the government’s inability to resist the policy prescriptions 
that came, principally from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), along with the 
loans during this period. It is in this backdrop that the government’s inability to 
provide infrastructure and services has affected growth adversely. 
 
Poverty 
We have said that characteristics of institutions associated with a stateless 
nation are the principal cause of runaway public debt but factors other than the 
growing indebtedness of the public sector—including the implementation of IMF 
financed adjustment policies—account for the deceleration in national output growth 
since the late 1980s. This raises two questions. First, did decelerating national 
growth accounts for growing poverty in Pakistan? Second, whether adjustment 
programmes also contributed to rising poverty? Before addressing these questions 
directly it may be useful to note the severe conceptual and empirical constraints that 
confront the student of poverty. 
Estimates of poverty are based mainly on either survey data or national accounts 
estimates.17 In a recent article, Deaton (2001) notes the many practical difficulties with 
data based on both these sources and the disparities between them, and concludes that 
“the World Bank should back away from its current too-concentrated focus on income 
headcount numbers. It should emphasise a much wider range of other measures, 
focusing on deprivations that may be more important than deprivation of income.” In 
the light of this suggestion research on Pakistan needs to go beyond the World Bank 
approach to address some of the concerns that underlie and motivate this 
recommendation. Until this happens, however, we have no option but to work with the 
income headcount numbers that continue to be used to measure poverty.18 
 
15The bulk of economics explores short-term problems by recourse to social science methods. In 
the exploration of long-term change—or development—however there are two distinct traditions within 
economics: social science (neo-classical economics) and the humanities (economic history and 
institutional economics). As Rostow (1984, p. 231) puts it: “I came to appreciate Marshall’s wisdom in 
asserting that if one pushed beyond the propositions of static short-period equilibrium, one must deal with 
‘real life,’ ‘the high theme of economic progress,’ and ‘society as an organism.’” 
16This is also the view of Bhatti (2002). 
17International comparisons also require either simple or purchasing power parity exchange rates. 
The latter are revised regularly “play[ing] havoc with poverty estimates” [Deaton (2001), p. 125]. 
18For estimates of poverty in Pakistan see Arif, Nazli and Haq (2000); Kemal, Irfan and Arif 
(2001); Jafri (1999) and Ali and Tahir (1999). 
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Does growth lead to a reduction in poverty in Pakistan? This question has 
been addressed in the literature in the context of the adjustment programmes pursued 
by government since 1988, with IMF finance and intellectual support. The view that 
adjustment programmes contributed to falling growth and rising poverty seems to be 
near unanimous. Most recently, Bengali and Ahmed (2002, p. 18) find that 
adjustment programmes pursued since 1988 have emphasised stabilisation at the 
expense of growth, a policy “that has contributed directly to the increase in 
unemployment and poverty.” Similarly, Kemal (2002, p. 17) notes that “over the ten 
year period from 1987-88 to 1997-98, the tax burden on the poorest increased by 7.4 
percent while it has declined by 15.9 percent for the richest households.” In addition 
to a more regressive tax structure, adjustment programmes resulted in reduced 
subsidies, development expenditures, and credit to the private sector “and as such 
impacted adversely on output and employment” [Kemal (2002), p. v]. Earlier Amjad 
and Kemal (1997) had also come to similar conclusions: “policies pursued under the 
Structural Adjustment Programme have tended to increase the poverty levels…”19 In 
Pakistan therefore there seems to be a consensus that adjustment programmes have 
contributed to increased poverty. 
 
3.  FORMULATING POLICY DIRECTIONS 
In this concluding section, we review the implications of the perspective on 
debt, growth and poverty in this paper for the crafting of policy proposals. Before 
doing so, however, it is important to define what is meant by policy. 
It should be obvious that policy is a course of action for “the few” (or the 
government) and not for the society or the nation as a whole. Since the passions and 
interests of the few are often at variance with if not in direct opposition to those of 
other groups in society, policy design and implementation become “strategic” 
activities. Strategic, in the sense that the final outcome depends on the relative 
success of competing groups in society who are all too aware of each other and seek 
to foil opponents in the attainment of their objectives. In order to qualify as a policy 
proposal, the proposal should: 
 (1) Not be “Agency-Free” in the sense that the proposal should identify 
clearly who will undertake the action that is expected to produce the 
desired result. (A good example of an agency-free proposal is given in 
the children’s story in which the mice propose to “bell the cat” to protect 
their lives. The proposal is technically sound. If done, it would have the 
intended result, but it does not identify the Agency who will do it.) 
 (2) Be within the Capability of the proposed Agency of action. (Thus the 
proposal that Mouse X should bell the cat is not agency-free, but is 
beyond the capability of the identified agent.) 
 
19See also Zaman (1995). 
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 (3) Not be against the inherent Nature of the identified Agent, or so against 
the Agent’s interest that the Agent would be unlikely to undertake what 
is expected of him within the limits of such persuasion as is proposed to 
be used. (Thus the proposal that the rich give away their wealth to the 
poor would not qualify as a policy proposal.) 
 (4) Be “Instrumental”—in the sense that instrument used to achieve the 
intended results should be independent of the target. (Thus the proposal 
to reduce the deficit by raising revenues and lowering expenditures is 
not a policy proposal. It is a tautological re-statement of the wish that 
the problem be solved. By contrast, the proposal to educate women in 
order to lower fertility rates is a policy proposal because it exploits a 
behavioural relationship—between education and fertility—in choosing 
an instrument to act on a target.) 
Finally, while proposals that meet these four criteria would qualify as policy 
proposals, they need not be good policy proposals. A good policy, while harder to 
define, anticipates the existence of opposing groups and forces in society and seeks 
to succeed by creating a sufficiently wide coalition of different groups in society that 
can prevail over opposing groups with the help of government. On these criteria, 
however, none of the current proposals for reducing sovereign debt or increasing 
popular well-being would qualify as a policy proposal much less a good policy 
proposal. 
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